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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS BOTH CORRECTNESS AND ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION 
Depending on the issue presented, the standard of review is either a correction of 
error standard or an abuse of discretion. Particularly, as to issues of what standard the 
trial court applied, those issues are reviewed for correctness. A court does not have 
discretion as to the standards it applies. Further, should this court find that the incorrect 
standard was applied, a significant question arises whether the court could exercise proper 
discretion. Stevenett v. Mai-Mart Stores. Inc.. 1999 UT 80. c 8. 977 P.2d 508. 
II. DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY PLAINTIFF'S UNFAIR SURPRISE 
The reality of plaintiff s position is an admission that the surprise evidence was not 
disclosed. Plaintiff admits defendant did not know of the demotion. Plaintiffs Brief at p. 
13, In. 6. As an excuse, plaintiff maintains that plaintiffs counsel did not know of the 
new evidence until the day before it was disclosed to the defendant. However, failure of 
either side's counsel to know about new evidence does not foreclose a new trial being 
granted. It is undisputed that the plaintiff herself knew about the demotion prior to trial. 
(V. 5, p. 12, In. 18—p. 13, In. 18). The fact that both parties are surprised by evidence 
leads more to the conclusion that a new trial should be granted. 
Plaintiff further ignores the admitted fact that at the latest, plaintiffs counsel knew 
of the surprise evidence of the demotion on Monday, but did not disclose the change that 
1 
day, or the following morning, but instead waited until an ambush could be unleashed in 
the presence of the jury. (V. 4, p. 91. 1.7-p. 92. 1.12). Even now. plaintiff offers no 
excuse for this delay. The prejudice of such actions taking place before the jury is self-
evident. Plaintiff had sufficient time to have an expert witness prepare a new report, but 
apparently no time, or desire, to inform defendant. Plaintiffs Brief at p. 13. 
Plaintiff even acknowledges that the surprise evidence is substantial. Plaintiffs 
Brief p. 13, In. 7. While plaintiff argues that defendant benefitted from the court's ruling 
regarding the report, the court still let in the fact of the demotion and allowed the 
economic expert to opine that the demotion would cause even greater damages. (V. 5, p. 
192-193). 
Plaintiffs position also down plays the significance of the difference between 
evidence which is speculative, even if probable, and evidence which is in fact advent. 
There is a significant difference between a plaintiff in a personal injur}7 action who claims 
that surgery will be needed in the future, and a plaintiff upon whom surgery has already 
been performed. In the former case, the defendant can always argue that the eventuality 
of surgery will not occur. Obviously, once the surgery has been completed, that argument 
is no longer available. 
In the present circumstances, that is the same prejudice which was visited upon the 
defendant. In the presented matter, the defendant committed to the position that while the 
plaintiffs physicians were saying that she could not work extended hours and that a 
2 
reduction in hours or pay was likely, the reality of the situation was that plaintiff was 
making more money at than she had at the time of the accident, and was working 
extended hours. Defendant had received plaintiff's W-2 wage records which indicated 
that in the year just prior to trial, plaintiff had made more earnings than in any previous 
year due to her promotion. (V. 6. P.l 10, Is. 12-20). Thus, the defendant had a good 
argument, which was presented in opening statement, as to how the case would develop. 
It is simply unfair to allow the defendant to move forward under evidence which has been 
disclosed, and then allow evidence in of a substantial change. 
The fact that the trial court did not let in the report of Dr. Randle does not mitigate 
the prejudice at all. The defendant did not get all that the defendant asked for. What the 
defendant asked for was a new trial. By allowing the economist to state that if a demotion 
occurred the damages would be greater, coupled with allowing the evidence of the 
plaintiff herself and her supervisor that she had been in fact demoted, leads to a 
conclusion that surprise was visited upon the defendant, which the defendant could not 
anticipate. Both changes in employment described by plaintiff occurred after her two 
depositions. 
Plaintiff attempts to make a great distinction between what she calls two changes 
in employment. First, a reduction in hours, and second, the demotion. Plaintiff does not 
deny that the demotion was not disclosed until midway through the trial to the defendant. 
However, a review of the record shows that the reduction in hours was not disclosed 
3 
either.1 Plaintiffs only explanation is that, for plaintiff at least, the evidence remains 
-fluid." 
To claim such a "fluid" state is simply to allow an\ plaintiff free reign to conduct 
trial by ambush. Any plaintiff in any personal injury case could claim that once a 
defendant is on notice of a claim of injury, then any aspect of their life can change, and 
those changed matters can be brought up in trial without disclosure. Defendants thereby 
can commence trial with little hope of knowing the facts which the plaintiff will put forth. 
Allowing for the "fluid" target of facts renders the discovery process an exercise in self-
indulgence, since the defendant may not in reality rely on anything, as the facts ma\ ha\ e 
changed. Of course, facts do change. However, the proper remedy in those 
circumstances is to continue the matter and allow a defendant discover} so that a response 
can be developed. 
Plaintiff claims defendant could have anticipated the evidence by conducting 
discovery. However, the outline of potential discovery ignores that all of the potential 
actions suggested by plaintiff would have occurred before reduction in hours or the 
demotion. In this case, the defendant had already deposed the plaintiff twice. Plaintiff 
essentially argues that instead of recognizing a duty to disclose, this court should force 
defendants to seek further discovery after the cut-off and keep taking depositions right up 
]The reduction in hours occurred sometime after June 23, 2000, just weeks before 
the trial. (V.6, p. 60, Is. 12-18). Even plaintiff cannot pinpoint this date for the court, but 
instead refers to the change as the "summer" of 2000. 
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until the eve of trial. Such an assertion is simply not reasonable. 
Surprise evidence constitutes grounds for a new trial under Rule 59 in this case. 
The trial court's only basis to deny the new trial in this regard was the fact that defendant 
should have known the plaintiff was having problems at work. The trial court's 
conclusion, however, fails to recognize any difference between alleged and amorphous 
"problems" and concrete changes in factual circumstances which in fact can be disclosed. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not granting a new trial, and therefore the judgment 
of the trial court should be reversed. 
III. INAPPROPRIATE AND PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS BY PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL WARRANT A NEW TRIAL 
As to plaintiffs counsel's closing argument, plaintiff maintains that counsel 
had the permission of the court to make the comments which were made. A review of the 
citation to the transcript offered by the plaintiff shows that this was not the case. While it 
is true that the court ruled the plaintiff would be able to talk about the fact the defendant's 
testimony was at odds with the defense experts' conclusions of what had happened in the 
accident, the court in no way gave broad license to the plaintiff to impugn defense 
counsel's integrity by claiming that defense counsel was hiding his client in a foreign 
country. The true context of the comments is apparent in the record. R. 841, pgs. 25-26. 
Plaintiffs argument fails to address the underlying error committed by the trial court at 
the commencement of trial, which was compounded by later statements improperly made 
by plaintiffs counsel. In the first place, the trial court should have allowed defense to 
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advise the jury as to exactl} where the defendant was. This court must appreciate that 
significant impressions are made by the jury at the commencement of trial. During 
opening statements, a jur\ can reach many conclusions and thereafter as the evidence 
comes in a juror will often view the case based upon the impressions made at the 
beginning of trial. Therefore, allowing the truth to come forward in closing arguments is 
simply too little, too late. In fact, the trial court recognized the basic unfairness which 
would arise if the jury had to consider the location of the defendant with no real 
understanding of where he was.2 
The prejudice suffered by the defendant was compounded by misrepresentations 
made in closing argument. Prior to trial, the defense had sought a continuance, which 
was opposed by the plaintiff, and denied by the court. Nevertheless, the plaintiff told the 
jury that defense counsel "chose" to try the case without the defendant there, thereby 
painting a picture the defense pushed the matter to trial specifically while the defendant 
was out of the country. In fact, plaintiffs counsel even told the jury that the defendant 
will be home within the next three months, inferring defendant could have waited if only 
defense counsel had so desired. (V.8, p. 87, Is. 9-12). This is simply a misrepresentation 
of the truth. The defense did not chose to try it without the defendant present, did not 
2(R.1175,p.70 Is. 22-25). 
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push the matter to trial without the defendant there, and would have been happy to wait 
for the defendant to be present at trial. The error of the trial court is further highlighted 
by the fact that the plaintiffs original objection to telling the jury of the defendant's 
location was allegedly to keep the jury from making any association between the 
defendant and any religious affiliation. On the other hand, as defendant's principle brief 
highlights, the plaintiff felt no compulsion to keep her religious affiliation from the minds 
of the jury. 
Likewise, the attacks on opposing counsel prejudiced the defendant and must lead 
this court to a conclusion that it's confidence that a fair trial was had has been 
undermined. Plaintiff offers no dispute on the cited case law regarding improper 
statements. Plaintiff argues alternatively either that the defendant's objections were 
sustained and that no remedy can be afforded thereafter, or that the comments were 
justified by the evidence. Neither of plaintiff s assertions have merit. 
In contravention to the law, and the jury instructions given to the jury, plaintiffs 
counsel essentially asks the jury to render it's decision based upon it's impression of the 
attorneys. (V.8, p. 13, LS. 4-15). While the defendant does not concede that Dr. 
Knorpp engaged in any wrongful conduct, even if evidence supports such a conclusion, 
the plaintiffs argument was that defendant's counsel had acted likewise. Plaintiff argues 
7 
that defense counsel hid facts, changed facts, and entered into a gentleman's agreement to 
suborn perjury. There is simply no evidence whatsoever that defense counsel entered into 
any such agreement, or attempted to enter into any such agreement. (V.8. p. 89. Is. 2-10). 
The courts of this state have held that it is improper to comment on a defendant's 
strategy and use of evidence for the apparent purpose of inflaming a juiy, State \ . 
Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah App. 1997), and is exactly what occurred in the present 
matter. The plaintiff improperly inflamed the jury, and impugned the honest} of opposing 
counsel.3 As such, the statements made b\ plaintiffs counsel further erode any 
conclusion that the jury's verdict was not inflamed. 
It is not unknown in Utah law for the appellate courts to specifically hold that 
improper argument may not be made. In Caperon v. Tuttle, 100 Utah 476. 116 P.2d 402 
(1941) the court held that counsel in argument may not use the word ^we" referring to the 
investigators of an accident, when it can suggest that counsel, or other persons not sworn 
in giving testimony, had reached the conclusion suggested by counsel. Likewise, in Eager 
v. Willis. 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003 (1966) the Utah Supreme Court held that a plea 
of counsel plainly designed to elicit sympathy or inspire passion or prejudice will not be 
3Plaintiff has in no wise showed the inapplicability of the precedent of Griffith v. 
Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 1957) or Lewis v. Cottonfelt Route-St. 
Louis Southwestern Railway Co.. 576 N.E. 2d 918, 978 (111. App. 5th Dist. 1991). 
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allowed. The holding of Eager obtains in multiple facets in the present matter. As shown 
above, misrepresentations made to the jury concerning conspiratorial conduct of defense 
counsel clearly is designed to inspire passion or prejudice. Likewise, plaintiffs plea of 
"who's going to pay" is designed to elicit sympathy. 
As to plaintiffs plea of poverty7, plaintiff maintains that the plea was onh one 
regarding accountability. However, nowhere in plaintiffs brief is any citation to any case 
in Utah or any state which indicates that accountability is an element of a negligence 
action. 
As to attacks on counsel in closing argument, plaintiff argues that plaintiff had 
permission and the sanction of the court to make the statements she did. However, a 
review of the transcript shows no such sanction of the court.4 The court stated it would 
allow plaintiff to make an association between the defendant's testimony and the 
conclusions reached by the experts called by the defendant in this matter. The trial court 
simply did not give open license for plaintiffs counsel to attack defense counsel. 
However, if this court were to accept the plaintiffs argument that such broad 
license was in fact granted, then this court can only find that plain error occurred. Should 
a trial court give license for an attack on opposing counsel, the actions of the trial court 
4SeeR.841 at 25-26. 
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constitute plain error. Further, to construe the trial court's comment to give such broad 
license to attack the strategy and actions of defense counsel would violate the law 
previously cited. 
Thus, plaintiff does not dispute that improper personal comments were made, nor 
does plaintiff dispute that the statements should not have been made in the first place. 
Plaintiff only claims that the defense got everything the defense wanted. Plaintiff misses 
the point that the assigned errors compounded the totality of the circumstances leading to 
a conclusion that the jury was tainted by prejudice. After the comments are made, the 
effect on the jury cannot be remedied. As a result, the verdict was likeh the result of 
passion and prejudice. Repeated injection of a personal opinion simply tainted the 
process. For these reasons, under U.R.C.P. 59, a new trial must be granted. 
IV. THE TESTIMONY OF DR. ROLLINS WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED 
The testimony of Dr. Rollins did not have sufficient foundation. Dr. Rollins' 
testimony failed to meet the requirements of State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 
1989). 
The testimony of Dr. Rollins was in fact novel. Interestingly, in order to buttress 
plaintiffs claims, plaintiff has resorted to making broad statements having no foundation 
whatsoever in the record. Moreover, the plaintiff cites for her foundational basis of Dr. 
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Rollins' testimony facts which in no way establish either expertise or the foundation for 
opinion. Specifically, the plaintiff places great emphasis on the fact that Dr. Rollins has 
testified in court before, even in Utah. However, the fact that an expert has testified in 
court renders absolutely no foundation for his opinions. First, simply stating that you 
have testified as an expert in court before does not prove that foundation was laid in those 
cases either. Perhaps, the testimony was even more admissible in those cases. Second, 
there was no showing whatsoever that those cases had anything to do with this case. 
Plaintiff fails to recognize the fundamental uncertainty in Dr. Rollins opinion. Dr. 
Rollins does not talk about the costs of actual medical treatment which will be received, 
but instead couches his opinion in the form of "types" of treatment that plaintiff "ma\ " 
need in a discretionary nature. Thus, the conclusion of Dr. Rollins is that the plaintiff 
may need one of the medical supplies, treatments, or interventions, or more. Thus, the 
jury was left to speculate as to exactly what treatment the plaintiff will incur. 
Plaintiff repeatedly in her brief refers to wCother" rehabilitation experts and what 
they might do. However, there is no testimony by Dr. Rollins, and no other evidence 
adduced whatsoever about any other rehabilitation experts. Plaintiff maintains that Dr. 
Rollins made no independent diagnosis. Actually, the record indicates that Dr. Rollins 
did associate an independent diagnosis which no other doctor had found, a diagnosis 
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which in the end proved to be false. Further plaintiff claims that life care plans are 
generated in nearly all major personal injury cases, but offers no basis for the conclusion 
for this court, and no citation to the testimony of Dr. Rollins. In fact, no such evidence 
was proffered. Dr. Rollins had "no idea" how mam cases he looked at similar to the case 
at issue. ( V. 5, p. 140. Is. 10-11). Dr. Rollins also testified that he did nothing to 
validate his conclusions on wages, (p. 146. Is. 20-22). Dr. Rollins also admitted he did no 
follow up on past cases to verify his conclusions, (p. 153-154). As far as foundation was 
concerned, if anything, defendant showed a lack of foundation. 
In the end, the foundation for Dr. Rollins simply is a case of diploma waving. It is 
no foundation at all. The simple fact that a person has a degree and other judges in other 
states have let him testify is valueless both as it's probative value to the fact finder and as 
a legal basis for a trial court to conclude the foundation has been laid. 
The objection made by the defendant, which was as to foundation, and further 
narrowed by defense counsel's reference to Rimmasch, was plenty to advise the trial court 
as to the objection raised.^ (V. 5, p. 95-96). The objection was summarily denied. A 
5Plaintiff attempts to mischaracterize defendant's objection as a "5-word 
objection." The objection actually identified the problem with the foundation as the 
unique kind of evidence being offered. The objection also included a side-bar conference 
with the court. Further, the objection was renewed after voir dire by the defendant. (V. 5, 
p. 112). 
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clarification was not sought by the trial court. It is abundantly clear that the trial court 
knew exactly what the defendant was talking about. References to Rimmasch are further 
found in the record. Plaintiff wholly ignores the voir dire conducted by the defendant and 
the objection which was restated at that time. (V.5, ps. 112 (defendant arguing to the 
court that it must invoke its gatekeeper function), 118). Thus, the Rimmasch challenge 
was plainly made, and the trial court simply refused to acknow ledge it. In fact, the 
defense had established that the science of rehabilitation was novel. After that initial 
finding, the Rimmasch criteria should have been applied by the trial court. The reason the 
record contains no reference to any Rimmasch findings is because (1) on both occasions 
the trial court summarily denied the objection, and (2) plaintiff argued that sufficient 
foundation had been laid. 
Rimmasch mandated: "In fine, the trial court should carefully explore each logical 
link in the chain that leads to the expert testimony given in court and determine its 
reliability. Only with such information can the overall decision on admissibility be made 
intelligently. In the absence of such a showing by the proponent of the evidence and a 
determination by the court as to its threshold reliability, the evidence is inadmissable. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403. Only after a showing of inherent reliability should the trial 
court move on to the other questions of admissibility. In this case, the trial court made no 
13 
threshold determination of reliability. Thereafter, the court should have made a separate 
inquiry- into whether there was adequate foundation for the testimony, i.e., proper 
application of the facts and testimony founded upon that proper application. Rimmasch. 
775 P.2d at 398. n. 7. Defendant maintains that sufficient foundation was neither laid 
under Rimmasch nor under the normal standard for expert testimony. 
In actuality, sufficient foundation had not been laid. Inherent reliability had not 
been shown, and the evidence was unfairly admitted. The prejudice of the 
erroneously admitted evidence cannot be overstated. Dr. Rollins was the primary witness 
to couch his testimony in dollar values for these items. Plaintiffs economic expert only 
employed the numbers supplied by Rollins, and the employment was the subject of 
defendant's objection as well. (V.5, p. 118. Is. 15-17). Accordingly, because the 
wrongfully admitted testimony was so prejudicial, the judgment of the trial court must be 
reversed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDES MR. TAMS 
The plaintiff does not dispute that if a juror is wrongly excused for cause, then 
effectively the plaintiff is given an extra peremptory challenge. People v. Lefebre. 5 
P.3d 295 (Colo. 2000); Bustamante v. People. 297 P.2d 538, 540 (Colo. 1956). Contrary 
14 
to plaintiffs assertion, the court did present juror Tams with a hypothetical.6 The 
hypothetical involved an injury7 to a daughter who wras a track star, as opposed to the real 
case mentioned by Mr. Tams which involved his daughter being a defendant in the 
lawsuit. While juror Tams indicated that he thought that the McDonald's coffee case may 
have been excessive, he even conceded that he did not know all the facts of this case, 
inferring that perhaps there were facts that justified that verdict. Juror Tams did not feel 
that juries were out of control. Juror Tams did not believe that caps needed to be placed 
on jury verdicts, nor did he have similar preconceived ideas. When asked whether he 
could be fair, Mr. Tams replied that he really thought he could. (V. 1, p. 99,1. 14). In 
discussing a hypothetical case where his daughter who ran track was injured, even in 
deciding her case, juror Tams stated that he would do his best to look at the facts of both 
sides and decide, and even stated that if he found that there were no facts supporting 
liability, he would render a no cause verdict against his own daughter. 
At the end of the day, this court can find that juror Tams answered the questions 
conscientiously. We can ask no more of jurors but that they simply state they will do their 
best. If this court sustains the trial court removing a juror for cause because he could not 
6Plaintiff asserts as to defendant's statement regarding a hypothetical, "This 
statement is false." Appellee's Brief at 26, n 16. The record is clear, however. 
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be 100% certain, then all conscientious jurors will be excused for cause. Plaintiff in no 
wise disputes the case law cited that to wrongfully excuse a juror for cause essentially 
awards an unfair extra peremptory challenge to the other party. This is exactly what 
happened in the present circumstances and is why reversal is mandated. 
A hypothetical was in fact presented to Mr. Tarns. Plaintiff fails to recognize that 
the court and Mr. Tarns talked about Mr. Tarns' daughter being a defendant in a real 
lawsuit. (V.l, p. 99. In. 19). The hypothetical concerned his daughter at BYU who ran 
track, involved in a hypothetical accident, as a plaintiff. In those circumstances. Mr. 
Tarns indicated he thought he still could be fair. (p. 99, In. 22). Even in those 
circumstances he indicated he would do his best to look at both sides and decide what was 
right, (p. 100. In. 6-8). Mr. Tarns even indicated that he could make a finding of liability 
against his daughter if the facts were appropriate, (p. 100. In. 22). The plaintiff would 
have suffered no prejudice had Mr. Tarns been left with the panel. The plaintiff simply 
could have invoked a peremptory challenge to remove Mr. Tarns. 
In fact, in discussing other cases, Mr. Tarns indicated that he would always look at 
the case. Mr. Tarns indicated that he was disturbed by the McDonald's spilled coffee 
case, but conceded that he did not know the facts, (p. 98. In. 7). Further, Mr. Tarns 
indicated that perhaps the verdict in the McDonald's case was justified, (p. 98, In. 20). 
16 
Mr. Tarns did not feel that juries were out of control, (p. 99). He did not believe there 
should be any caps on damages and stated he had no preconceived ideas, (p. 99, In. 7). 
When asked whether he could be fair to both sides, his actual comment was: *i really 
think I could/* (p. 99, In. 14). 
Juror Tarns did not approach the kind of bias which requires dismissal for cause. 
To be excused for cause as to the juror's state of mind, Utah.R.Civ.P. 47(f)(6) requires a 
showing: 
That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice 
to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon 
the matter or cause to be submitted to the jury, founded upon public rumor, 
statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the 
court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and 
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to them. 
Thus, the rule anticipates jurors setting aside opinions and feelings. The criminal procedure 
rule is the same. Utah.R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). The Utah Supreme Court has described this 
state of mind upon which a for cause showing must be based as one of "strong and deep 
impressions which will close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in 
opposition to them; which will combat that testimony and resist its force/* State v. Hewitt, 
689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984)(quoting State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 
17 
1980)). Juror Tarns does not even approach such a state of mind. 
Juror Tarns did not have strong feeling such as those found in State v. Baker. 884 P.2d 
1280 (Utah App. 1994). where in a child rape case a juror stated that he sister had been 
raped and that he could not be fair and impartial. The Baker case and the present 
circumstances are not remotely similar. In fact. Baker supports the conclusion that the trial 
court abused its discretion in this case. In Baker, the court discusses a number of decisions 
where a trial court does not endeavor sufficiently to rehabilitate a juror. The trial court 
abused its discretion in this case by failing to further rehabilitate juror Tarns, and more 
significantly, for excusing juror Tarns for cause where no strong feeling had been exhibited. 
Simply stating that the circumstances of one's family would be on one's mind hardly 
constitutes such strong feelings. If absolute certainty is the standard, all conscientious jurors 
will be excused for cause. Only those jurors who consider their minds to be impregnable 
through their life's experiences will remain on juries. Thus, the juries will be made up of 
only the self-deluded. Rule 47 does not require perfect jurors, as did the trial court in this 
matter. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. 
VI. ALLOWING THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY CONSTITUTED ERROR 
Plaintiffs argument as to the improper rebuttal testimony in this matter addresses the 
wrong one of two questions. The analysis between the parties focuses on whether the 
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evidence was admissible at all. and whether the evidence was admissible as proper rebuttal. 
It is defendant's contention that the evidence was inadmissible as proper rebuttal. 
Initially, it should be noted that plaintiff maintains the defendant admitted that the 
evidence was properly admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 608(c). A review of the 
transcript shows this to be a misrepresentation. The transcript indicates: 
The Court: Let me ask you on that same Rule, going down to sub-section (c). though, 
isn't it certainK possible to argue that if Dr. Knorpp in fact had made the statements 
that were claimed, that that shows bias or prejudice on the part of the w itness. 
Mr. Ivie: Yes, I think that could be argued. Your Honor. But the fact remains that it 
was evidence that he himself elicited, the plaintiff, so I do maintain that it is improper 
rebuttal. 
P. 4. In. 11-19. Accordingly, defense counsel admitted that the argument could be made, not 
that the Rule of Evidence applied. More importantly, however, defense counsel pointed out 
at the time, the assertion was more pointedly that the evidence constituted improper rebuttal. 
For this same reason. State v. Reed. 820 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991) as relied upon by 
the plaintiff is not helpful in the present context. Reed simply does not address whether 
rebuttal is proper for evidence adduced by the plaintiff himself. 
Interestingly, plaintiff attempts to cite a statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 for the 
proposition that the evidence was admitted for rebuttal and concludes that a statute trumps 
arule. See Plaintiff s Brief at page 21, footnote 10. Apparently, plaintiff is unaware that the 
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law in the State of Utah is different. The sections of the Utah Code dealing with e\ idence 
were superseded by the 1983 enactment of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Reference should 
be made to the preliminary note of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Slusherv. OspitaL 777 
P.2d 437, 443. n.10 (Utah 1989). Of course, the statute does not address the issue of proper 
rebuttal. 
This court in Astill v. Clark. 956 P.2d 1081 (Utah App. 1998) explained: 
Rebuttal evidence has been defined as 'evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, 
or otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence/" Randle v. 
Allen. 862 P.2d 1329. 1338 (Utah 1993). Rebuttal evidence should be limited to 
evidence made necessary by the opponent's case in reply. C.J. Wigmore Evidence. § 
1873. at 672 (1976). and evidence required to counter new facts presented in the 
defendant's case in chief. The purpose of rebuttal evidence is not to merely contradict 
or corroborate evidence already presented, but to respond to new points or evidence 
first introduced by the opposing party. 
Astill. 956 P.2d at 1086 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the primary focus of this court should be on the fact that rebuttal 
evidence is to rebut evidence introduced by the opposing party. In the present matter, the 
evidence was not introduced by the opposing party. Instead, plaintiff was attempting to rebut 
evidence the plaintiff herself had elicited. As such, the evidence was not proper rebuttal 
evidence. 
As such, the case of Koch v. Koch Industries. Inc.. 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 
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2000), is applicable. There, the 10th Circuit upheld a refusal of the trial court to allow a 
rebuttal witness to rebut testimony intentionally elicited by the defendant's w itness on cross-
examination. The Koch court stated: "[W]hen an attorney conducting cross-examination 
affirmatively doles out specific testimony, as it occurred here, the district court does not 
abuse it's discretion in disallowing rebuttal to that testimony." Koch, 203 F.3d at 1226. 
Even cursory reading of the Koch opinion shows that the opinion is not based upon the 
applicability of any rule of evidence, but instead focuses upon the issue of proper rebuttal. 
Further, the principles of Koch are consistent with Utah's law as set forth in AstilL Plaintiff 
does not dispute that evidence first introduced by cross-examination cannot be considered 
evidence presented by the opponent's case-in-chief. State v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230, 1231 
(Utah 1984). Accordingly, since the evidence at issue was only elicited by plaintiff, it did 
not constitute part of defendant's case, and therefore the rebuttal allowed was in error. 
The testimony of Dr. Knorpp came as no surprise to the plaintiff. The cross-
examination of Dr. Knorpp was the trap the plaintiff anticipated well before trial. The 
inflammatory and prejudicial nature of the wrongfully introduced rebuttal evidence is 
underscored by the plaintiffs closing argument that a conspiracy exists between defendant's 
counsel and Dr. Knorpp. (V.8, p. 13, 84, 85, 86, and 87). It was therefore error to allow the 
rebuttal witness, and this error resulted in significant prejudice. As such, a new trial must 
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be granted. 
VII. THE ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTE 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Defendant was not given a fair trial in this matter. The combined prejudicial effect 
of the improper arguments of counsel, and surprise evidence leads to a conclusion that a fair 
trial was not had. This prejudice is compounded by the improper exclusion of juror Tams 
giving the plaintiff, in reality, a greater number of peremptory challenges than the defendant. 
Because this court's confidence that a fair trial occurred must be undermined, a new trial 
must be granted. Whitehead v. American Motor Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920.928 (Utah 1990). 
The cumulative effect of the errors outlined mandate reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the defendant was not given a fair trial in this matter, and for the legal errors 
made below, this matter must be reversed and a new trial granted. 
DATED AND SIGNED the 7 t h / d^ySan i^Q2002 . / 
R. PHIL IVIE 
>AVID N. MORTENSEN 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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